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IMAGE RIGHTS, CREATIVITY AND VIDEOGAMES  
 




I. CELEBRITIES AND VIDEOGAMES  
 
Videogames characters and avatars have been inspired by real people for decades, but now, 
technology and hyperrealism have increased the creative potential and consequentially the artistic 
and economic value of image rights4, thus creating new opportunities for celebrities to monetize 
image rights through licensing.  
 
The link between the videogame character and the real person from whom the developers have drawn 
inspiration may often not even be immediately recognisable, for instance, when only a few traits of 
the celebrity are reproduced and the level of decontextualization of the avatar is significant: it is hard 
to see Theodore Roosevelt behind Mr. Robotic, the arch enemy of Sonic, the iconic SEGA hedgehog, 
even in its most realistically designed version5. Conversely, in other instances, developers might aim 
for the avatar to be easily and immediately linked to the celebrity, and this may, and often does, serve 
a specific creative purpose. 
 
The inclusion of a celebrity in a videogame may be intended to generate greater involvement and 
players’ participation6, or to manifest endorsement and promote the game. For instance, the presence 
of Kevin Spacey as a villain in Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare, while not being necessary for 
narrative reasons, attracted the public’s attention in very much the same way as the presence of 
Cristiano Ronaldo on the cover of FIFA served to promote the game within his supporters and 
followers. 
 
Using images of real people may in some instances serve a parody purpose. A character might be a 
caricature of a persona that may be seen as representing a certain group culture. In World of Warcraft 
you might come across the archaeologist Harrison Jones, which combines Harrison Ford traits with 
the very essence of Indiana Jones, and the blood elf vendor “Haris Pilton” accompanied by her 
inseparable pet Tinkerbell. Beyond the examples of cameos, videogames can also be entirely created 
for political parody such as the third person shooter Rise of Trump, where players help winning the 
presidency an orange tanned Donald Trump endowed with small hands, by gunning down his political 
enemies and convincing moustached Mexicans to pay for the wall. Similarly, several popular mobile 
games allow users to relax by punching and slapping Donald Trump, Ted Cruz and several other 
political figures. These videogames are – obviously – not endorsed by the political figures they are 
referring to. 
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Last but not least, in sports games the use of athletes’ images is crucial as this genre relies heavily on 
realistic representations of existing sports figures7 and of the arenas hosting the events (including 
spectators). Similarly, war games with historical settings may need to reproduce historical figures in 
order to make the historic setting more convincing and accurate. 
 
The inclusion, within a videogame, of an avatar which faithfully reproduces a real person has value 
for a number of actors operating within the videogame industry, from the developers and publishers 
to the players themselves. However, a person has in principle a right to control the reproduction of 
its image and this right often causes tensions. However, in the absence of international treaties and 
harmonized rules on image rights, the specific way in which these rights have been acknowledged 
and developed may, and often does, vary significantly from country to country. This should come as 
no surprise since the right to control one’s individual image is closely tied to a country’s fundamental 
rights. 
 
Indeed, in different jurisdictions the law admits, to varying extents, to individuals a certain degree of 
control over their name, photo, likeness, signature, and so on8. Under certain circumstances, an 
individual is legally entitled to license their image rights to a third party, but never to the point of 
depriving the image rights’ holder of the right of using their own image.  
 
Differences in respect of the legal status of image rights between national laws affect videogames in 
particular, because digital games often have a global reach and are distributed in tens of countries 
worldwide, which may trigger the application of the national laws of all the countries in which the 
game content is made available. 
 
The result is that identifying, and considering, all potentially applicable national law rules, exceptions 
and limitations when clearing image rights for videogame use, may turn into a time-consuming legal 
conundrum. More specifically, whenever the use of an image is a means for an author to exercise 
their freedom of speech and expression, it is necessary to strike a balance between this fundamental 
right and the conflicting image rights. However, given the absence of clear and internationally 
recognised rules or principles on how this conflict should be resolved, this is an area where managing 
risks associated with the distribution of game content is no easy task, which may lead developers and 
publishers to take a risk adverse approach at the expenses of freedom of expression and creativity.       
 
II. THE P.E.M. (Prevalent, Exploitative, Misleading) TEST 
 
The United States9 case law has developed several different tests in order to identify the balance point 
between the right of publicity and the right contained in the First Amendment to the US 
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Constitution10. These tests are: the transformative use test, which focuses on the degree of creative 
transformation of the image11; the predominant use test, which considers whether the purpose of the 
work is predominantly commercial or expressive12 and the relatedness test (or so-called “Rogers 
test”13), concentrating on the question of whether or not the image is wholly unrelated with the work 
where is reproduced and, consequently, consumers may be explicitly misled into believing that 
celebrities are endorsing the reproduction of their images14.  
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This allowed the Court to sanction a use that was partly creative – and therefore likely to satisfy a transformative use test. 
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(2d Cir. 1989), a lawsuit which concerned the right of publicity of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, whose first names 
were mentioned in the title of the Federico Fellini’s movie “Ginger and Fred”. 
The test extended to publicity right claims the same reasoning used in relation to trademark violations under the Lanham 
Act. Using this test the Court reached the conclusion that the use of a celebrity's name in a movie title should not be barred 
unless the title was «wholly unrelated» to the movie or was «simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods or services».  
The Rogers test evaluates the relationship between the image and the alleged reproduction of the image, and it does so by 
considering the work of art as a whole, instead of merely looking at the use of the image per se. 
14 Moreover, in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit 
applied a fourth balancing test, which is known as the ad-hoc balancing test. This test highlights that courts, when 
establishing whether a reproduction of a certain celebrity’s image infringes the celebrity’s image rights, should take into 
account the importance that image rights and freedom of expression have in the case at hand, both for the parties of the 
proceeding and for the society at large. However, this test does not seem to constitute per se an alternative test, insomuch 
as it does not introduce any (new) specific criterion to be relied on for the purposes of making the assessment. 
Unsurprisingly, the ad-hoc test was applied in conjunction with the transformative use test by the Sixth Circuit in ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). On the desirability of combining the transformative test with 
the ad-hoc test see also D Georgescu in ‘Two Tests Unite to Resolve the Tension Between the First Amendment and the 
Right of Publicity’ (2014) 83, Fordham L. Rev., 907. 
Each of these tests focus on different, and yet all relevant, aspects of the relation between the image 
and the work featuring that image. If considered on their own, these tests present meaningful limits 
and may lead to very different, and therefore often unpredictable, results, which in turn creates 
uncertainty around what should constitute a sanctionable image rights’ violation, and what 
shouldn’t15. 
 
We argue that all three tests fail to provide clear enough guidance to the legal practitioner advising 
the developers team on the risks associated with their work as the creative team has imagined it and 
that their application may lead to different results according to the judges thus making an analysis, 
let alone a global analysis, impractical and consequently are only of limited practical use. 
 
Therefore, in an attempt find the synthesis between the different approaches available under US case 
law, which is the most developed law on the topic of image rights, creativity and videogames, we 
have tried to combine them with a view to suggesting a more precise path to assess the level of risk 
associated with using, without authorisation, a real-life person’s image in a videogame. The three 
prongs we suggest are: 
 
1. Are the imitative elements of the real-life person image prevalent vis-à-vis - the creative 
elements of the character?  
2. Is the use exploitative? 
3. Is the use misleading?16 
 
We regard the profound differences that still exist at country-national level in respect of how 
videogames are perceived in society depending on local culture as a potential weakness in respect of 
the possibility that the test we suggest may work internationally. This is because the question, which 
is cultural in nature, whether videogames should be recognised as a form of artistic expression and, 
therefore, be treated with the same dignity as and on a par with other, more established and therefore 
more widely accepted, artistic expressions like filmmaking, painting, photography, etc., does not 
receive a uniform answer in all jurisdictions. 
Therefore, before we turn to discuss how each of the three prongs above may work in the context of 
assessing when the developers’ right to free speech and expression should out-weight a real person’s 
image rights, let us be straight on this fundamental point: videogames are creative works and should 
enjoy full freedom of speech protection. 
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This reasoning is in line with the nature of the right of publicity as described by the United States Supreme Court in 
Zacchini v. Scripps Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) «[t]he rationale for protecting the right of 
publicity is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill. No social purpose is served 
by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would 
normally pay». 
It appears that a similar argument could also be used in countries where image rights are not expressly recognised to argue 
that the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s image should constitute passing off. This was the case in the UK with Topshop 
t-shirts with Rihanna’s face on in Fenty & Ors v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) & Another [2013] EWHC 2310 
(Ch). In particular, the judge although stressing that «the mere sale by a trader of a t-shirt bearing an image of a famous 
person is not, without more, an act of passing off» considered that, in the case at issue, a substantial portion of consumers 
considered that the use had been authorized by the pop star and therefore constituted passing off.  
Videogames collections and exhibitions are now present at the Smithsonian American Art Museum, 
the New York MOMA, the V&A in London17. However, the recognition of videogames as a form of 
art has long been met with reservations. Some art critics, such as the late film critic Roger Ebert18, 
were reluctant to accept the artistic nature of videogames19 and are still prudent when conceding that 
a certain videogame or certain elements of videogames20 are works of art. The majority, however, 
finds increasingly difficult to deny in principle the artistic value of videogames, though taking the 
view that the ‘art’ label should only be reserve to few “masterpieces”21. 
 
Leaving the art world debate aside, the crucial point is the recognition that videogames have received 
by courts of law and how their artistic recognition might influence the balancing of conflicting rights. 
Courts and legislators – similarly to art critics – struggled to recognize the artistic value of the 
videogame as a medium22 and videogames as comprehensive works of art were recognized for the 
first time in 2011's Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association when Judge Scalia held that: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, videogames communicate ideas – and 
even social messages – through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and 
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual 
world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. Under our Constitution, “aesthetic and 
moral judgments about art and literature … are for the individual to make, not for the Government to 
decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority”.23 
As a general principle, with a view to encouraging and promoting artistic creations, the limitation of 
an artist’s freedom of expression should be kept to a minimum. Consequently, the artistic recognition 
of videogames, we argue, should meaningfully affect the balancing of conflicting rights and whenever 
a person’s image is reproduced within the context of a videogame with some artistic value, that value 
should proportionally move the balance point to the developers’ side24 allowing them a greater room 
for fair use of a third party’s image rights25. 
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speech. The Court finds that videogames have more in common with board games and sports than they do with motion 
pictures. A few courts have looked at whether "Bingo" is speech and protected under the First Amendment. In this 
instance, the Seventh Circuit held that "Bingo" does not convey ideas, nor does it contain "expression"». 
23 See Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
24 As referred to in C Coors, ‘Celebrity image rights versus public interest: striking the right balance under German law’, 
(2014) 9, in JIPLP, 835, in the German case Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, 23 July 2013, I-20 U 190/12, regarding 
unauthorized portraits of the golf player Martin Kaymer, the Court – while denying that the claimant’s portrait 
reproducing the athlete, should fall under the protection afforded by the freedom of the art principle provided in Article 
5(3) of the German Basic Law – recognized that, in principle, «the manipulation of a photo of a celebrity is a creative art 
form in itself that requires skill and precision» and that «the style, quality level and content of the art can play a role in 
the assessment of whether artistic freedom must yield to conflicting constitutional interests».  
25  See, inter alia, City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 
(1993).  
When the sport artist Jireh used Tiger Wood’s image as the main subject of one of his paintings, the 
Court found that there was no false endorsement, also in light of the artistic value of the painting at 
issue, providing that «when an artist adds significant expressions then the artist enjoys First 
Amendment Protection for his work»26. 
 
It should follow that whenever a videogame character clearly refers to a certain celebrity and does 
not seems to be particularly transformative, the artistic value of the videogame and the functional link 
between the character and the narrative should become crucial in assessing whether or not an 
unauthorized use of a celebrity’s image was legitimate. 
 
However, despite the observed trends within American case law, judges worldwide are not often 
assessing whether the videogame at issue should be considered an art piece27 which means that the 
relevance of the artistic value of the videogame still remains largely disregarded. 
 
1. Prevalent imitative use  
 
Since videogames are art and this is why they in principle attract First Amendment protection in the 
US and given that characters carry significant creative weight within a videogame as key literary 
devices, then the artistic value of a videogame character, on the one hand, has an important impact 
on the overall creativity of a game whilst, on the other hand, it should be a factor per se capable of 
resolving a conflict between the right of an individual to control their image and the right to free 
speech. 
 
Sometimes the developers draw inspiration from one or more real life personas to create an original 
virtual character with its own features. Think of Lara Croft or Kratos28. The archaeologist protagonist 
of Tomb Raider was inspired by real life celebrities, yet probably no one would say who they were 
without more precise indications from the developers and this is because, while the videogame 
character could remind the observer of someone the latter may know, Lara Croft individual features 
outweigh the imitative ones and are those that the observer would recognise and appreciate the most29. 
Characters like Lara should, and most probably would, be regarded as original according to any test 
in any jurisdiction. The use of a third party’s image here is highly transformative because the character 
is highly creative. Likeness with a celebrity, if any could be spotted, is not relevant to the game being 
sold and it would seem very unlikely that consumers could be misled into believing that a certain 
celebrity is somehow affiliated with the game. Moreover, while the purpose of the work is, 
undoubtedly, predominantly commercial, the use of the celebrity’s image within the game is not, 
regardless of the predominance of the character itself.  
 
Generally speaking, whenever the character bears a considerable degree of originality and 
creativeness, the restriction of the freedom of expression of the developer in view of the image rights 
                                                     
26 See Etw Corporation v Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
27 For instance, see Hamburg Higher Regional Court, 13 January 2003, 7 U 41/03 and TJSP, proceeding no. 1126481-
26.2016.8.26.0100, Judge Rodrigo Cesar Fernandes Marinho, decided on 27 August 2017, where respectively, German 
and the Brazilian Courts are not addressing the issue of whether videogames are qualified for protection by freedom of 
expression. 
28 Kratos is the main character of the videogame saga God of War, he is a Spartan hero with the troubled past of a Greek 
God. The designer of Kratos revealed that he took inspiration from Edward Norton playing a nazi in the movie American 
History X, see Zak Islam, ‘Jaffe Reveals Inspiration Behind Kratos’  
<https://www.playstationlifestyle.net/2010/07/22/jaffe-reveals-inspiration-behind-kratos/> accessed on 15 September 
2019. 
29 In fact, the celebrities inspiring Lara Croft changed over time without players really noticing it. Lara was initially 
inspired (also) by the Swedish singer Neneh Cherry, then played by several actress, including Keeley Hawes, Jonell Elliott 
and others and most recently by Camilla Luddington in the Survivor Timeline. 
of the real-life personas (which somehow inspired that creation) should be considered in principle 
unjust. 
 
Sometimes, however, videogame characters are not strong, unique heroines and heroes like Lara Croft 
or Kratos. Sometimes the character is meant to be a stereotype of a certain pop culture, a certain 
generation or social background. The features of the character are therefore pop culture 
condensations, rather than distinctive and unique characteristics traceable back to a certain real-life 
person. Here, the character probably suggests only some connection with whomever is considered a 
stereotype of that same group in real life or in connection with other forms of art. Of course, people 
who based their commercial success on being exactly that stereotype might recognize themselves in 
such videogame characters, and so might do the public at large. 
 
Lacey Jonas and Antonia Bottino, two minor characters in Grand Theft Auto V, were surely 
incorporating two different stereotypes: the image of an obsessed anorexic teen actress-slash-singer 
and the Italian American mob boss’s daughter. Lindsay Lohan and Karen Gravano, finding that the 
characters of Lacey and Antonia were based on them, brought claims against the videogame publisher 
Take-Two Interactive Software, alleging a violation of their publicity right.  
 
Both lawsuits were finally tossed out by a 6-0 vote of the New York State’s highest Court30, which, 
with specific regard to the claim regarding the Lacey Jonas character found that the character was 
lacking a physical resemblance with Lohan and that «the ambiguous representations in question are 
nothing more than cultural comment that is not recognizable as plaintiff and therefore is not 
actionable»31. According to the Court «the Jonas character simply is not recognizable as plaintiff 
inasmuch as it merely is a generic artistic depiction of a “twenty something” woman without any 
particular identifying physical characteristics»32, therefore confirming that the right of publicity will 
not cover those personality traits that are not distinctive of a certain specific character. 
 
Prior to Lohan’s and Gravano’s lawsuits, even the singer and fashion icon Kierin Kirby tried (and 
failed) to demonstrate that a videogame character was created in violation of her image rights33. The 
character in question was Ulala, protagonist of Space Channel 5, a videogame published by Sega of 
America, Inc.  
 
Ulala’s similarity to Kirby was probably stronger than that of Lacey Jonas and Antonia Bottino with 
Lohan and Gravano34; furthermore, Sega had also somehow declared its intent to use Kierin Kirby as 
an inspiration for one of its characters, by asking Kirby for a license on her image rights, which she 
refused to grant. Nonetheless, the character was found to be transformative enough to deserve 
protection under the First Amendment. What contributed to this ruling was that, similarly to Grand 
Theft Auto V’s characters, Ulala was actually based on a certain style, namely the Japanese style of 
“Anime”, more than on a specific celebrity and, therefore, the virtual character was not solely 
referring to Kirby.  
 
These cases seem to confirm that the actual scope of image rights may not be broad enough to include 
also those characteristics which are - or became - typical of a certain stereotype, more than of a 
specific character. 
                                                     
30 See Lohan v Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. 92 N.E.3d 807 (N.Y. 2018) to which Gravano v Take-Two Interactive 
Software, Inc. N.Y. Slip Op. 60748 (N.Y. 2018) is referring in turn. 
31 Ibidem.  
32 Ibidem. 
33 See Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006). 
34 In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., Kierin Kirby claimed that the defendant copied «her “unique public identity,” which 
combines retro and futuristic visual and musical styles, results from her signature costumes and lyrical expression» in 
Ibidem. 
 
However, in these cases the plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate a real physical resemblance 
between themselves and the characters, and that the characters’ names were significantly different. 
Indeed, the outcome of the lawsuits may well have been very different if there had been a physical 
resemblance and / or the names of the characters had recalled the names of the celebrities.  
 
A very similar name, together with a strong physical resemblance was that of Ellie, the 14-year-old 
protagonist of the game The Last of Us, with the actress Ellen Page. Here, the degree of physical 
similarities (especially in the first videogame trailer35), the assonance between the names and the fact 
that the Canadian actress was interpreting another videogame’s character at the time The Last of Us 
was released, could have been an argument for establishing that the use was imitative and exploitative. 
Ellen Page never brought claims against it as the actress simply criticized the developers for ‘ripping 
off her likeness’36 when designing the character Ellie.  
 
2. Exploitative use  
 
If the degree of similarity between the real person and the image as reproduced in game plays an 
important role in the analysis, this is not to say that there cannot be imitative uses that may be 
legitimate even without the celebrity’s authorization, provided that exploiting the real person’s image 
is not evidently the sole reason of the use.  
 
In more practical terms this means that the reproduction should have a primary artistic and not 
exploitative purpose and that the use of that image should be consistent and proportionate to its artistic 
role within the videogame. Parody is one example.  
 
The online game Moshi Monsters developed by the British entertainment company Mind Candy 
featured a character named Lady Goo Goo, a toddler singer with platinum blonde hair and big 
sunglasses. The character appeared as a caricature of the artist Lady Gaga but bearing a significant 
transformation and quite a clear parodying intent. However, while, English law provides the 
possibility of a common law action for passing off whenever the reproduction constitutes false 
endorsement, the UK does not have any specific law on image rights per se37, which, considering the 
parody intent of the reproduction in question, would have made it hard to argue that Lady Goo Goo 
was unlawfully reproducing Lady Gaga’s features38. However, Lady Gaga was not only the nickname 
of Ms Germanotta, but also a trademark, and Mind Candy was indeed sued for trademark 
infringement39. The fact that English trademark law does not provide for a parody defence40 led the 
English High Court of Justice to rule in favour of the plaintiff giving us little indication on what could 
be the scope of parody in relation to the unauthorized use of celebrities’ images. 
                                                     
35 The character was redesigned before the release of the videogame to resemble more like Ashley Johnson, the actress 
that was actually playing Ellie, thus in its latest version the character resembled less Ellen Page. 
36 See Erik Kain, ‘Ellen Page Says Naughty Dog 'Ripped Off' Her Likeness For The Last Of Us' 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/06/24/ellen-page-says-naughty-dog-ripped-off-her-likeness-for-the-last-
of-us/#43788bcc3f2e> accessed on 15 September 2019. 
37 As the Court of Appeal provided in Fenty & Ors v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) & Another [2013] EWHC 
2310 (Ch) «There is in English law no “image right” or “character right” which allows a celebrity to control the use of 
his or her name or image». 
38 See also footnote 16 above in relation to the possibility of arguing passing off in similar cases. 
39 Ate My Heart Inc v Mind Candy Ltd [2011] EWHC 2741 (Ch). 
40 However, recital 27 of the  Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of 16 December 2015 and recital 21 of 
the Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of 16 December 2015, both passed after the ruling in this case, 
while not providing an explicit parody exception in relation to trademark infringement, make  reference to fair use of 
trademark for the purpose of artistic expression and provide that the piece of legislation should be applied in a way that 
ensures full respect for freedom of expression. 
 
Of course, the parodying intent often requires - in order to be effective - a unique reference to a certain 
public figure and, moreover, obtaining a license on the use is usually not an option.  
 
One could argue that certain public figures lose some control over their image because they lose 
control over the historic character they come to embody. This could apply to famous artists also but 
has a greater relevance when dealing with politicians and in general with historical characters. On the 
other hand, freedom of expression in a democratic society calls for enhanced protection in respect of 
all political criticism.  
 
Subject to the limit that public figures should not be portrayed in a way that would unjustly harm the 
honour, reputation or decorum of the person being portrayed, the scope of the right of parody in 
relation to politicians would largely depend on the specific jurisdiction we are in and, in that regard, 
it is difficult to find some common ground.  
 
In general, whenever a public figure is reproduced for the purpose of political criticism or that of 
leveraging on historic realism of the videogame, the reputation of the public figure, the artistic value 
of the game and the proportionality of the use of the image that is made within the game are all 
elements that should be taken into account when assessing whether or not the use is exploitative. 
 
For instance, the reputation of a certain public figure may narrow the scope of protection of their 
image rights. This could have happened, for instance, to the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. 
 
Activision featured a character in Call of Duty: Black Ops II which was named after the dictator 
(although you may recall him by the nickname “pineapple face”) and had his physical features. 
Noriega, from jail, claimed that his image rights were violated as the character’s aspect was 
replicating exactly his image. However, the Court stated that the use of Noriega’s image was 
legitimate after applying the transformative test41. Some scholars argued, not without merit, that 
Noriega did not have a publicity right to start with because he had no right to profit from the 
exploitation of his image, since his celebrity depended mostly on the infamous action he committed 
and, therefore, that the Court should not have applied the transformative use test, because doing so, 
it suggested that Noriega has some rights of exploiting his image42. 
 
Applying a similar reasoning in a reversed situation, also the underlaying message of the videogame 
as a whole – more than the character itself – should be relevant. This is the case of the French 
videogame “Jean-Marie, jeu national multimedia”, developed by Philippe Le Gallou – member of the 
right-wing extremist party Front National – which featured a character that reproduced the president 
of the association SOS Racisme (Fodé Sylla) as one of the “enemies of France” who Jean-Marie Le 
Pen would have to defeat in order to reach the Elysée.  
 
The videogame’s character was found to be in violation of Fodé Sylla’s image rights and, also in 
consideration of the political scope of the game43, the freedom of expression-based defences did not 
                                                     
41 Manuel Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal Super. Ct. 2014) 
42 See J Sinclair, ‘Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard: The First Amendment Right to Use a Historical Figure's Likeness in 
Video Games’, (2015) 14 Duke Law & Technology Review 69-82 (2015). Sinclair’s theory that celebrity’s image rights 
should not be an absolute right, but instead should depend upon the celebrity’s reputation, is convincing, especially 
because it fits perfectly with the doctrine which, perceiving the image as an asset, maintains that the image right’s scope 
should be linked to the investments made in order to build a certain image. Understood in this way, celebrities would be 
rewarded not regardless in relation to their image but limiting to unique and somehow positive features. 
43 See ruling "jeu multimédia Front national 92", Cour d'appel de Versailles, 8 mars 1996, Gazette du Palais, 1 mai 1996. 
hold up in court. In fact, the character was found to be an unauthorized reproduction, created for 
political reasons and not with a parodying intent44. 
Moreover, also whenever the balance point between the celebrity’s image rights and the videogame 
developer freedom of expression tends towards the artist, the use of the reproduction in marketing 
material should be an indication that the use at hand may be exploitative. 
3. Misleading use 
 
There is still a question whether is safe to assume that a reproduction of an image without any original 
narrative or a parodistic value, but which is not exploitative of a certain celebrity’s image, is lawful. 
 
In order to answer this question, it is important to consider whether the public would assume that the 
image was reproduced under license. 
 
This is evident with sports games’ characters, which faithfully physically reproduce the athlete within 
a similar context without any original narrative or a parodistic value, but which are often a necessary 
videogame element whenever we deal with state-of-the-art sports games. 
 
On the one hand, it is true that athletes invest a lot on the construction and maintenance of their image 
and some argue that because of this their images rights are afforded quite a strong protection45, also 
because the athletic career is limited in time and licensing revenues may be important support for 
some athletes at a later state. On the other hand, when developing a sports game, characters based on 
real-life athletes are essential to make the videogame realistic.  
So far, most unauthorized uses of athletes’ images were found by American Courts not to be protected 
under the First Amendment and when called to decide on a publicity right violation claim US judges 
have tended to apply the transformative use test46, by comparing the athlete’s image with the character 
in itself - rather than considering the character within the videogame context as a whole. The result 
was that athletes’ videogame avatars were rarely found to be transformative enough47 to justify the 
compression of the conflicting real person’s image rights.  
The appropriateness of the transformative use test - as it has been applied so far48 - has been heavily 
lamented. Some judges criticized the narrow application of the transformative use test and suggested 
                                                     
44 Moreover, even though the ruling does not refer to it, the dubious content of the videogame – which was described as 
racist – may also played a part in the balancing between the developer’s rights and the image rights of Fodé Sylla. 
45 Consistently with the doctrine which perceives the image as an asset referred also in M H Redish and K B Shust, ‘The 
Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech’, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1443 
(2015), at least whenever a celebrity’s image is at issue, image rights scope should be linked to the investments made by 
a given celebrity in order to make their personality unique. 
46 See Hart v Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2013), Keller v Electronic Arts, Inc. No. 10-15387, 
2013 WL 3928293, *5 (9th Cir. 2013) and O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F.Supp.3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
An exception to this tendency was Brown v Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) where the Court applied 
the Rogers test – instead of the transformative use test – and held that the use of Brown’s likeness in Madden NFL games 
was protected by First Amendment, because it was artistically relevant to the games.  
47 In Hart v Electronic Arts, Inc., the 3rd Circuit held that «the NCAA Football 2004, 2005 and 2006 games at issue in this 
case do not sufficiently transform Appellant's identity to escape the right of publicity claim». 
48 Courts, when applying the transformative use test, generally have compared the videogame character with the real 
person taking into consideration the player image, without considering the videogame character within the videogame 
context. 
the creative elements and the features of the videogame as a whole should be evaluated, rather than 
focusing on the avatar’s degree of resemblance with the person’s image49. 
 
From a US perspective, the Rogers test instead of the transformative use test could lead to a fairer 
balance between image rights and freedom of speech and also ensure that videogame characters are 
not treated differently from other form of artistic portrayal50. 
On the other hand, though any use of players’ images is in principle relevant to a sports videogame, 
judges should avoid resorting to an interpretation of the scope of the First Amendment that legitimates 
that athletes’ images may be included into sports videogames without the athletes receiving fair 
compensation. 
 
Ultimately, the principle is that any reproduction that would represent false endorsement should be 




There is clearly a trend, which we believe will continue in the future, towards licensing of image 
rights whenever a celebrity is due to be included in a videogame. This may be explained partly 
because a celebrity image license agreement is normally combined with a professional services 
agreement that ensure the active collaboration and engagement of the celebrity and partly because the 
national laws normally afford celebrities a significant degree of protection over their image. In 
parallel, we also see a new trend, with the United States leading the way, towards a stronger protection 
of the right to free speech and freedom of expression in connection with videogames based on the 
view that videogames may qualify as works of creative and artistic expression.  
 
The lack of harmonized rules, however, and the different subtleties in image rights protection that are 
still to be found at national law level are all elements that generate uncertainty and contribute to the 
image rights clearance to be more a business decision than a regulatory compliance activity. 
 
This produces inefficiencies as whenever it is not clear if the unauthorized use is lawful at a global 
level, the savvy business decision for the developer is to contractually regulate the third party’s image 
use, which almost inevitably, though, will entail additional production costs.  
 
This may have the de facto consequence of favouring the protection of image rights over free speech, 
even when a potentially legitimate unauthorized image right use is at issue. 
 
Thus, in an attempt to suggest a more precise path to assess the level of risk associated with using, 
without authorisation, a real-life person’s image in a videogame that may work internationally as a 
source of guidance for assessing the likelihood that the unauthorised use of a real person’s image 
within a videogame may be legitimate, we suggest the relevant assessment is carried out taking into 
consideration the following: 
                                                     
49 Judge Ambro dissented in Hart v Electronic Arts, Inc., concluding that «the creative components of NCAA Football 
contain sufficient expressive transformation to merit First Amendment protection». Similarly, Judge Thomas in Keller v 
Electronic Arts, Inc. held that «the creative and transformative elements of Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football video game 
series predominate over the commercial use of the athletes’ likenesses, the First Amendment protects EA from liability». 
Moreover, J. Thomas considered – in accordance with J. Ambro opinion in Hart, that «[t]he majority confines its inquiry 
to how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game, rather than examining the transformative and creative 
elements in the video game as a whole. In my view, this approach contradicts the holistic analysis required by the 
transformative use test». 
50 See MD Bunker and C Calvert, ‘Video Games and the Right of Publicity: the Courts Drop the Ball’, (2016) 93(3), 
Journalism Mass Commun. Q, 627. 
1) the artistic weight that the creative use of the virtual reproduction of a celebrity bears in respect 
of the specific videogame as an artistic work,  
2) the possible exploitative intent behind the reproduction of a certain celebrity’s image; 
3) the eventuality that the public is misled into thinking that the reproduction was specifically 
authorized by the right holder, 
and we have formulated a three prongs test – the P.E.M. test - to serve this specific purpose. 
